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I. Introduction
During his October 10th, 1997 National Address, the President of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev stated: “Kazakhstan of 2030 must
be a clean and green country with clear air and pure waters. Industrial waste and
radiation [will] no longer enter its homes and gardens. Our children and children
of our children [will] live a full value life in healthy conditions.”1 This address set
the stage for Kazakhstan’s transition from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic’s
(U.S.S.R.) literal dumping ground for waste to a first world country.
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2016, B.S. from the University
of Washington. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Sam Williams, Jim Peters, and
David Maris, members of the Wyoming Law Review editorial board. A special thanks to Professor
Robison for his guidance and many helpful comments on my initial draft. Also, eternal gratitude to
my family.
1
State of the Nation Address, Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
(Oct. 16, 1997), http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/page_address-ofthe-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-to-the-people-of-kazakhstanoctober-10-1997_1343986436.
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In a subsequent address, introducing Kazakhstan’s Strategy 2050 Plan
(Strategy 2050), President Nazarbayev explained:
Kazakhstan owns a territory so vast it would tire the wings of
a bird to fly over it. Thus, this plan requires huge funds and
hard work. There is a saying: “If you want to know a nation’s
prosperity look at its paths.” Road connections are of high
importance, not only for travel, but also for the transportation
of goods. In ancient times our big cities were located along the
Great Silk Road.2
This address was intended to reintroduce a sense of greatness by tapping
into the nation’s historical prominence as a portal from the Far East to the
West, similar to how the nation is currently tapping into its land for natural
resources.3 In a separate address, President Nazarbayev acknowledged the large
costs for developmental projects.4 Kazakhstan’s developmental projects are
funded by foreign investment through the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID).5 Funding is conditional and often dictates specific
projects, commitment levels, and compliance capabilities; however, it may have
adverse long-term consequences as well.6
Although Kazakhstan is a relatively new and developing country, it has an
emerging economy and aspirations for a sustainable development.7 Historical
tribal diversity and previous rule by the U.S.S.R. shape the culture, politics,

2
State of the Nation Address, Official Site of the President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_218343 [hereinafter State of the
Nation Address]; see also State-of-the-Nation Address by President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev,
Kazakhstan 2050 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://strategy2050.kz/en/news/5142/; Address by the President
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Leader of the Nation, N.Nazarbayev “Strategy Kazakhstan-2050”:
New Political Course of the Established State” (Dec. 12, 2012), http://strategy2050.kz/en/page/
message_text/ [hereinafter Strategy 2050].
3

See generally State of the Nation Address, supra note 2.

4

See Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

5

See infra notes 33–91, 168–71 and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 33–91, 168–71 and accompanying text.

“Sustainable development” will be referenced throughout this comment and is defined
as the “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.” This definition is widely accepted by the international
community and first appeared in Our Common Future (the “Brundtland Report”), which was a report
published by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. See, e.g., John
Drexhage & Deborah Murphy, Sustainable Development: From Brundtland to Rio 2012, Int’l Inst.
for Sustainable Dev. 2 (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/
shared/gsp/docs/GSP1-6_Background%20on%20Sustainable%20Devt.pdf [hereinafter From
Brundtland to Rio].
7
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technology, and economy of the country.8 Therefore, this comment provides
a general overview of Kazakhstan’s unique history and abundance of natural
resources. It also uses Kazakhstan’s Strategy 2050 to determine if Kazakhstan
will be able to meet its goal of becoming a “developed” nation by the year 2050
without compromising its international environmental obligations, in particular
its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. An analysis of the pertinent
provisions of Kazakhstan’s Strategy 2050 illustrates that although Kazakhstan is
currently on track to meet its modest international commitments, particularly
with regard to the Kyoto Protocol, its commitments are meager in comparison to
many European Nations that are trying to lead the fight against climate change.9
As a result, this comment discusses a prospective analysis for the upcoming
2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference and Kazakhstan’s post-2020
climate change commitments.
Part II discusses a brief history of Kazakhstan, its environment, the relevant
sections of Strategy 2050, and its current international environmental obligations,
with particular focus on the Kyoto Protocol and related instruments.10 Part
III then shows how Strategy 2050 is in compliance with Kazakhstan’s treaty
obligations and concludes with the upcoming 2015 United Nations Climate
Change Conference in Paris (Paris Conference) and post-2020 projections.11

II. Background
A. Kazakhstan’s History and Environment
Although Kazakhstan is an old nation dating back to the Kazakh Khanate of
1458, it was dramatically transformed while it was a part of the Russian Empire
and when it was part of the U.S.S.R.12 Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan
forged its own policy in virtually all sectors, including politics and infrastructure.13
Geographically, Kazakhstan is a very large country; however, lack of water, arable
land, and infrastructural shortcomings create obstacles for sustaining a large
population.14 Thus, Kazakhstan’s population is small compared to the territory
it encompasses.15 Because much of the country is not well supplied with water or
8
See generally Didar Kassymova
Woronoff ed., Scarecrow Press 2012).
9

et al.,

Historical Dictionary

of

Kazakhstan (Jon

See infra note 152 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 12–97 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 101–71 and accompanying text.

12

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 1.

13

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 1.

14

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 1.

Id.; see also Kazakhstan Population 2015, World Population Review http://world
populationreview.com/countries/kazakhstan-population/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2015) (“Kazakhstan
as a whole has a density of six people per square kilometer (15/square mile), which ranks 227th in
the world.”).
15
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arable land, it is difficult for the government to provide services to its population.16
However Kazakhstan is well endowed with minerals and energy resources that
provide the state with considerable and reliable export revenues.17 The landlocked
country also contains diverse topography “ranging from mountains to deserts”
with “[a]rable lands mak[ing] up only [eight] percent of the territory.”18 This
diversity and size has led to significant allocation and management issues.19
Even though Kazakhstan has an abundance of exportable natural resources,
it faces many domestic problems, including inadequate infrastructure inherited
from the Soviet era.20 Aside from solving a multitude of social and economic
problems, Kazakhstan also created a functioning state—between progressive
European countries and the conservative Asian continent—which caused political
pressures.21 Kazakhstan also struggles with water scarcity issues.22
Water scarcity is a natural and human-induced dilemma.23 Although “there
is enough freshwater on the planet for seven billion people,” it is unevenly
distributed, wasted, polluted, and unsustainably managed.24 According to the
United Nations, “[w]ith the existing climate change scenario, almost half the
world’s population will be living in areas of high water stress by 2030.”25 Studies
from 1996, 1997, and 2001 regarding climate change predictions stated that
“available water resources of the main basins within Kazakhstan will decline by
at least 20–22%, the occurrence of droughts will sharply increase, and the grain
crop productivity will decrease by 20–23%.”26 Water issues are relevant because
they are addressed in Strategy 2050 and will likely continue to be exacerbated by
climate change.27
16

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 1.

17

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 1.

18

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 2.

19

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 2; see infra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.

20

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 2.

21

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 2; see infra notes 33–73, 168 –71 and accompanying text.

22

See Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

Water for Life Decade: Water Scarcity, United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml [hereinafter
Water Scarcity].
23

24

Water Scarcity, supra note 23.

Water Scarcity, supra note 23 (“Hydrologists typically assess scarcity by looking at the
population-water equation. An area is experiencing water stress when annual water supplies drop
below 1,700 [m3] per person . . . . Water scarcity is defined as the point at which the aggregate impact
of all users impinges on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional arrangements to
the extent that the demand by all sectors, including the environment, cannot be satisfied fully.”).
25

26
Assessment of Snow, Glacier and Water Resources in Asia, IHP/PWRP-BERICHTE 100
(2009), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/Glacier%20in%20Asia_lowres.pdf
[hereinafter Assessment].
27

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.
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At the beginning of the twenty-first century, only sixty percent of Kazakhstan’s
rural population had fresh water for indoor plumbing.28 Many areas relied on
water from other sources, such as wells, rivers, and springs.29 For example, the
Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash, both located in the Western region of Kazakhstan,
together serve as internal-drainage reservoirs for “[a]bout 40% of the territories
of the five [Commonwealth of Independent States], Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.”30 This implicates transboundary
disputes in “regions sustain[ing] 80% of the population and represent the
overwhelming part of the irrigated land within these countries.”31 Additionally,
the Aral Sea continues to diminish due to the excessive water consumption from
the cotton-centered economy of the Soviet era.32 Since 1960 seventy percent of its
water was lost.33
Water allocation and conservation are pressing contemporary issues.34
Despite its large number of rivers and lakes, Kazakhstan is considered one of
the most water-deficient countries in the world.35 Because its rivers and lakes
cross boundaries with other nations, Kazakhstan has been compelled to form
disadvantageous transboundary agreements with neighbors.36 Disadvantageous
transboundary agreements, inadequate infrastructure for irrigation, distribution,
transportation, and contamination treatment make Kazakhstan’s water shortage a
significant threat to environmentally sustainable development.37 The Caspian Sea
Region typifies many of the water resource issues in Kazakhstan. It contains the
largest enclosed water reservoir in Kazakhstan and serves as an asset to the country
because of its oil and gas deposits, unique flora and fauna, and its role in balancing
the climate and environment.38 However, poor maintenance, monitoring, and
ongoing property disputes between nations leaves the Caspian Sea’s future
uncertain and the surrounding countries treading water until a settlement can
be reached.39
28

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 3.

29

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 281.

30

Assessment, supra note 26, at 161.

31

Assessment, supra note 26, at 161.

32

Assessment, supra note 26, at 3.

33

Assessment, supra note 26, at 3.

34

Strategy 2050, supra note 2, at 2–3.

35

Strategy 2050, supra note 2, at 2–3.

Kassymova, supra note 8, at at 2–3; see Joshua Kucera, After Summit, Caspian Sea Questions
Linger, The Diplomat (Oct. 2, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/after-summit-caspiansea-questions-linger/ (explaining that although the five countries bordering the Caspian Sea came
together to formalize a convention, issues remain unsolved; Russian President, Vladimir Putin
stated that: “it seems that some big compromises are going to have to be made quickly.”).
36

37

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 2.

38

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 3.

39

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 3.
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The water issues described above are only one aspect of the larger challenges
Kazakhstan faces regarding environmental issues. Currently, Kazakhstan is
struggling to strike a balance between recovering from the environmental damage
inflicted from the Soviet Era by embracing green technology and achieving
rapid economic growth, often resulting in long-term environmental damage.40
This tension is reflected in Kazakhstan’s climate change goals and status in its
international obligations.41

B. International Environmental Obligations Regarding Climate Change
Climate change is one of the most imminent and important issues the
world faces as an international community.42 This section first discusses the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Convention or
UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (Protocol). It then describes the UNFCCC’s imperfect
categorization scheme, and discusses how Kazakhstan’s commitments are affected
by its unique status.43

1. The Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
The Convention is an international environmental treaty that was produced
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992.44 The Convention’s objective was “to achieve . . . stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”45 There have

40
See Asia and the Pacific: A Story of Transformation and Resurgence, United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Aug. 2014), http://www.unescap.
org/sites/default/files/Asia%20and%20the%20Pacific-A%20Story%20of%20Transformation%20
and%20Resurgence.pdf (“[a]chieving economic, social and environmental objectives for a country
requires coordination between many agents, namely, government, producers, consumers and
domestic and foreign investors; policies, namely, sectoral, fiscal and monetary, and trade policies;
and institutions, including regulatory agencies and the judiciary . . . . This could only be done
through national long-term plans for achieving sustainable development . . . . Economies in
transition refer to those which were previously part of the USSR and have been undergoing marketoriented reforms since its break-up in 1991.”).
41

See infra notes 53–82 and accompanying text.

The Global Climate Change Regime, Council on Foreign Relations (June 19, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-climate-change-regime/p21831.
42

43

See infra notes 44–74 and accompanying text.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC ]; see also First Steps to a Safer Future:
Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/conven
tion/items/6036.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter First Steps].
44

45

UNFCCC, supra note 44.
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been several subsequent climate change conferences which have had varying
degrees of success.46 Because of the large scale of involvement, the framework of
the Convention is important.47
In order to achieve these goals the Convention is organized into observers and
parties.48 Observer organizations are composed of representatives from United
Nations agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental
organizations among others.49 Parties are divided into three categories: Annex I,
Non-annex I, and Annex II; there are also forty-nine nations designated as least
developed countries.50 Annex I Parties are comprised of industrialized countries
and transitioning economies.51 Non-annex I Parties are comprised of developing
countries and those “especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate
change.”52 Least developed countries, a sub-category of Non-annex I Parties, have
limited capacity to respond to climate change and are considered when funding
and technology decisions are discussed.53 Party categories are determined by
looking at many factors, including per capita emissions, the country’s financial
and institutional capacity to address climate change, and the “common but
differentiated responsibilities” embodied in Article 3.1 of the Convention.54

46
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, Climate Change
Secretariat 17–20 (2006), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf [hereinafter
Handbook] (giving background information on the history and development of the Convention:
The first world climate conference was in 1979, and a proposal by Malta on 1988 prompted the
adoption of the United Nations GAOR Resolution 43/53, which “recognized that ‘climate change is
a common concern of mankind, since climate is an essential condition which sustains life on earth’
and that ‘necessary and timely action should be taken to deal with climate change within a global
framework.’” Since the proposal’s adoption, annual conferences are held.).
47

See Handbook, supra note 46.

Parties & Observers, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter
Parties & Observers].
48

49
Parties & Observers, supra note 48 (“Over 1880 NGOs and 100 IGOs are admitted
observers.” The NGOs are from diverse fields and represent many interests, including “business
and industry, environmental groups, farming and agriculture, indigenous populations, local
governments and municipal authorities, research and academic institutes, labour unions, women
and gender and youth groups.”).
50

Parties & Observers, supra note 48.

Parties & Observers, supra note 48. For the list of all Annex I Parties to the Convention visit
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php.
51

Parties & Observers, supra note 48. For the list of all Non-annex I Parties to the Convention
visit http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php.
52

53

See Parties & Observers, supra note 48.

Handbook, supra note 46, at 46; see also The Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities: Origins and Scope, Centre for International Sustainable Development Law
(2002), http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf (“The principle of common but
differentiated responsibility includes two fundamental elements. The first concerns the common
responsibility of States for the protection of the environment, or parts of it, at the national, regional
54
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During the 1997 Convention in Kyoto, Japan, the objective was to “build[]
upon and enhances many of the commitments already in place under the
Convention.”55 The Kyoto Protocol was finally ratified on February 16, 2005.56
“The core commitment under the Kyoto Protocol . . . requires each Annex I
Party to ensure . . . its total emissions from GHG sources listed in Annex A
to the Kyoto Protocol over the commitment period do not exceed its allowable
level of emissions.”57 The Protocol initially bound Annex I Parties and “major
industrialized countries—with the exception of the United States, which has not
ratified the agreement—to a greenhouse gas (GHG) emission control system from
2008 to 2012.”58 The gases enumerated in Annex A of the Protocol are limited to
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons,
and sulfur hexafluoride.59
Two criticisms of the Protocol are its categorization scheme adapted from the
Convention and its failure to account for developing or fast-growing countries
under its emission control system including China, India, and Brazil.60 Without
the participation from developing countries, it is impossible to protect the climate
system.61 “Nearly [eighty] percent of the world’s population lives in developing
countries, which account for almost [fifty] percent of the world’s GHG emissions.”62
Because such a large percentage of GHG emissions remain unregulated, the
Convention’s goals will never be met.63 The traditional categorization scheme has
left out many developing nations, namely Kazakhstan, because it was seen as new,

and global levels. The second concerns the need to take into account the different circumstances,
particularly each State’s contribution to the evolution of a particular problem and its ability to
prevent, reduce and control the threat.”).
Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual on Accounting of Emissions and Assigned Amount, United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 12 (2008), http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.pdf [hereinafter Reference Manual].
55

Kevin A. Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate Change
Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 365, 365–66 (2006).
56

Reference Manual, supra note 55, at 13; see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.
pdf [hereinafter Protocol ].
57

Baumert, supra note 56, at 365–66. Currently, there are 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
to the UNFCCC: The only nations that have not signed are Afghanistan, Sudan, and the U.S.A. See
Baumert, supra note 56, at 366.
58

Reference Manual, supra 55, at 106 (Annex A lists Greenhouse gases as well as sectors/
source categories).
59

60

Baumert, supra note 56, at 366.

61

Baumert, supra note 56, at 366– 67.

Baumert, supra note 56, at 366; see also Kevin Baumert & Jonathan Pershing, Climate
Data: Insights and Observations, Pew Center on Global Climate Change 37 (2004), http://www.
qualenergia.it/UserFiles/Files/Cl_St_01_Climate_data%20_pew_2004.pdf.
62

See generally Kazakhstan, Climate Action Tracker , http://climateactiontracker.org/
countries/kazakhstan.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2015).
63
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underdeveloped, and insignificant when the Convention was formed.64 To add
or remove Annex I Parties, the Convention employs a formal treaty amendment
procedure.65 A nation seeking to join Annex I must submit a proposal to the
Conference of the State Parties (COP) six months in advance.66 The Protocol also
requires at least three-fourths of Parties’ approval to adopt an amendment.67 The
overwhelming majority of nations have accepted and abided by their status since
designation, but that does not mean re-categorization cannot be made to account
for changed circumstances.

2. Kazakhstan’s Status Under the Protocol
Initially, Kazakhstan was categorized as a Non-annex I country. After only
eight years into nationhood, Kazakhstan formally submitted a request to add
its name to Annex I in 1999.68 In the proposal, the Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Kazakhstan stated the following rationale:
Taking into account great importance of global ecological
problems facing humanity in whole and Kazakhstan in particular,
the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan has concluded
appropriate procedures and took decision to request the [COP]
to the UNFCCC to consider the possibility of joining of the
Republic of Kazakhstan to the list of countries contained in
Annex I to the UNFCCC . . . . The Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to the secretariat of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change the assurances of
its highest consideration.69
Kazakhstan’s initial proposal failed to garner consensus because some developing
countries, that vehemently opposed binding commitments, were concerned about
the precedent of expanding the exclusive family of Annex I Parties.70 Thereafter,
Kazakhstan used the notification procedure in Article 4.2(g) of the Protocol to
64

Reference Manual, supra note 55, at 13.

65

Baumert, supra note 56, at 390.

Baumert, supra note 56, at 390; see also Amendment to Annex I to the Convention, United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1 (1999), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
cop5/02.pdf [hereinafter Amendment to Annex I ]; see also Handbook, supra note 46, at 78 (“According
to Article 4.2(g), any Party not included in Annex I may at any time notify the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, as the Depositary of the Convention, that it intends to be bound by Article
4.2(a) and 4.2(b).”).
66

67

See Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 20, ¶ 4, art. 21, ¶ 7.

68

Amendment to Annex I, supra note 66, at 1.

69

Amendment to Annex I, supra note 66, at 2.

70

Baumert, supra note 56, at 393.
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bind itself to the Article 4.2 obligations of Annex I Parties.71 Though bound by
Article 4.2, Kazakhstan remains a Non-annex I Party under the Convention.72
However, for the purposes of the Protocol, Kazakhstan has Annex I Party status
because the Protocol gives Annex I status to any Party that avails itself of the
Article 4.2(g) notification procedure.73 As a result Kazakhstan is stuck in “no
man’s land.”74
One implication of having Annex I status for the Protocol and Non-annex I
status for the Convention is the inability to host Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) projects.75 As stated in the Protocol:
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to
assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of
the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments under Article 3.76
Because Kazakhstan has no legally binding emissions obligations under
the Protocol and because it remains outside Annex B, it cannot participate in
international emissions trading either.77 CDM projects are important under

Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 1, ¶ 7 (stating a “‘Party included in Annex I’ means a
Party included in Annex I to the Convention, as may be amended, or a Party which has made a
notification under Article 4, paragraph 2 (g), of the Convention.”); see also Protocol, supra note 57, at
art. 4, ¶ 2 (stating “[t]he Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the
agreement on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of this
Protocol, or accession thereto. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and signatories to the
Convention of the terms of the agreement.”); UNFCCC, supra note 44, at art. 4, ¶ 2 (concerning
Annex I Parties’ commitment to return 2000 emissions to 1990 levels); Baumert, supra note 56,
at 390.
71

72

Baumert, supra note 56, at 392–93.

73

Baumert, supra note 56, at 393.

74

Baumert, supra note 56, at 393.

Baumert, supra note 56, at 393 (stating CDM projects may only be hosted in Non-annex
I countries). Additionally, Non-annex I Parties will “benefit from project activities.” Protocol, supra
note 57, at art. 12, ¶ 3(a)–(b). Whereas Annex I Parties may “use the certified emission reductions
accruing from such project activities to contribute to [their] compliance.” Brendan P. McGivern,
Introductory Note to Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto
Protocol, 37 I.L.M. 22, 27 (1998).
75

76

Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 12, ¶ 2.

Option Review for Kazakhstan to Participate in the International Carbon Market, Climate
Focus (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/sector/eecc/kaz.pdf [hereinafter Climate
Focus]; see also Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourteenth Session, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change 14, 18 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2008/cop14/eng/07.pdf [hereinafter Report of the Conference] (noting Kazakhstan’s emission
77

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol16/iss1/7

10

Cleveland: How Kazakhstan’s Strategy 2050 Affects its Current International

2016

Comment

109

the Protocol’s regime because the projects enable Annex I countries to be in
compliance with the emissions commitments.78 The CDM projects do this by
awarding credits—from allowing developed nations to benefit from project
activities—resulting in certified emissions reductions.79 CDMs also contribute
to “[r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of
climate change.”80
Trading of CDM projects and emissions could serve as a substitute to
foreign loans and could foster mutual trade and technology transfers in
Kazakhstan. However, because Kazakhstan is excluded from both CDMs and
emissions trading, reliance on EBRD and USAID is perpetuated.81 Kazakhstan’s
decision to change its categorization scheme excluded itself from participating
in CDM projects, and has caused other lasting consequences.82 Therefore, it is
important for Kazakhstan to become an Annex I Party to build its image as a
developed nation.

3. Kazakhstan’s New Categorization Obligations
In a November 2009 letter, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister informed the
Secretariat of the decision to reduce GHG emissions from its 1992 levels: fifteen
percent by 2020 and twenty-five percent by 2050.83 The decision to reduce GHG
emissions followed Kazakhstan’s proposal for an amendment to Annex B of the
Kyoto Protocol to include a voluntary quantitative commitment for maintaining
the anthropogenic GHG emissions of Kazakhstan for 2008 to 2012 at one
hundred percent of their 1992 levels.84 At the Doha 2012 climate negotiations,

reduction commitments as voluntary and listing Kazakhstan as an Annex I Party); Kazakhstan’s
Submission to the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
(CMP) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) on Clarification
of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (2009), https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/application/pdf/
for_sbsta_from_kz.pdf (noting that Annex B lists each Party, and their respective quantified
emission limitation or reduction commitment (percentage of base year or period)).
78
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/
items/2718.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2015) [hereinafter CDM].
79

See CDM, supra note 78.

80

Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 12, ¶ 5(b).

See Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 12. This could work in Kazakhstan’s favor if it implemented
an emission-reduction project in a developing country because it would earn certified emission
reduction (CER) credits, which are counted towards Kyoto targets which helps Kazakhstan reach
its goals.
81

82

See Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 12.

83

See generally Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 12.

84

Report of the Conference, supra note 77, at 14.
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Kazakhstan agreed to adopt a GHG emissions reduction target for the period
between 2013 and 2020.85
As part of the Protocol framework, Kazakhstan implemented a mandatory
emissions trading scheme in 2013 for industrial and power sectors.86 The penalty
for noncompliance is approximately one hundred dollars per metric ton of carbon
dioxide (CO2).87 This penalty will help promote sustainable energy.88 Kazakhstan
has also provided information for its quantified, economy-wide, emission targets
and underlying conditions.89 This is consistent with the information Kazakhstan
has previously provided on pledges.90 While Kazakhstan should be commended
for setting and reaching goals, given the highly extractive and damaging industries
that thrive within the country, Kazakhstan has only pledged baseline goals.91

C. Strategy 2050
The New Economic Policy, “Nyrly Zhol” is Kazakhstan’s global step to
becoming one of the thirty most developed countries in world by 2050.92 Nyrly
Zhol has three goals: (1) To define new markets where Kazakhstan can form
productive partnerships and create new sources of economic growth, (2) to create
a favorable investment climate, and (3) to develop an effective private sector and
public-private partnerships.93 In 2014, President Nazarbayev outlined the two
stages of Strategy 2050.94
The first stage of Strategy 2050 encompasses the period until 2030 when
Kazakhstan will make modernization leaps that continue to grow its traditional
85
Strategy for Kazakhstan, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 17
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/country/strategy/kazakhstan-strategy-2013.pdf
[hereinafter Strategy for Kazakhstan] (agreements also included the European Union (EU), Australia,
Belarus and Ukraine); see Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Dec. 8, 2012), https://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/CN/2012/CN.718.2012-Eng.pdf (not entered into force).
86

Strategy for Kazakhstan, supra note 85, at 17.

87

Strategy for Kazakhstan, supra note 85, at 17.

88

Strategy for Kazakhstan, supra note 85, at 17.

Quantified Economy-Wide Emission Reduction Targets by Developed Country Parties to the
Convention: Assumptions, Conditions, Commonalities and Differences in Approaches and Comparison
of the Level of Emission Reduction Efforts, UNFCCC (Oct. 18, 2013), http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2013/tp/07.pdf.
89

Appendix I—Quantified Economy-Wide Emissions Targets for 2020, United Nations FrameConvention on Climate Change (2014), http://unfccc.int/home/items/5264.php [herein
after Qualified Economy-Wide Emissions Targets].
90

work

91

Qualified Economy-Wide Emissions Targets, supra note 89.

92

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

93

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

94

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.
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industries and create a processing industrial sector; similar to South Korea and
Singapore.95 The second stage covers the period from 2030 to 2050 and seeks to
ensure sustainable development by emphasizing improvement of new and existing
laws on venture financing, protection of intellectual property, and support for
research and innovations.96 Kazakhstan is also working on commercialization of
scientific developments in the Nazarbayev University Intellectual and Innovational
Cluster in Astana and the Alatau IT Park in Almaty.97 Although Kazakhstan
is within its modernization leap stage, until 2030 climate change serves as an
imminent threat to natural resources and ecosystems; large-scale sustainable
development projects should not wait until 2030. However, Strategy 2050 is not
silent on the issue of climate change.98 The Strategy affects Kazakhstan’s GHG
emission goals and environmental preservation by requiring compliance with its
international commitments, namely the Protocol.99

III. Analysis
Many developing nations must face the same difficult decision as Kazakhstan
of whether to prioritize economic growth, which often boosts social welfare by
allowing better education and infrastructure, or join much of the developed world
and prioritize combating climate change, at the expense of economic growth from
reliance on existing natural resource wealth.100 The purpose of this section is to
analyze and critique the aspects of Strategy 2050 that implicate Kazakhstan’s
current and future climate change commitments. The analysis will show
that Kazakhstan’s goals deserve scrutiny. It will also question whether energydependent countries and those that heavily rely on proceeds from extractive
industries should be required to abide by more stringent emissions commitments. The relevant sections of Strategy 2050 are the provisions addressing
global energy security, the exhaustion of natural resources, and water shortages.101
At this time, Kazakhstan appears to be meeting its current obligations. However,
the period beyond 2020 will be determinative: Kazakhstan will choose to align
itself with nations tackling climate change at the expense of economic growth, or
it will continue to focus on becoming a developed nation by 2050.

95

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

96

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

97

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

98

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

99

Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 2, ¶ 1(a).

100

See infra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.

101

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.
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A. Global Energy Security
Strategy 2050 recognizes the trend developed countries follow of investing in
alternative and green energy technology.102 However, Kazakhstan maintains that
its oil and gas reserves are vital and seeks to make large profits internationally in
the energy sector because of its reliable strategic partnerships, particularly with the
EU.103 The energy industry is a prominent source of income for Kazakhstan.104
Kazakhstan is the third-largest supplier of energy to the EU outside the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).105 Therefore,
cooperation in the energy sector between the EU and Kazakhstan is crucial and will
increase in the future as European companies participate in the exploration of the
Kashagan oil field.106 Despite signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Kazakhstan has restricted itself by its Annex I Party status for the Protocol, and its
exclusion from any beneficial CDM projects.107 The MOU focuses on building
a relationship between the EU and Kazakhstan for transporting hydrocarbon
resources from Central Asia to the EU markets. The MOU only mentions its
intentions for the future are to develop and introduce alternative energy sources,
and ecologically clean and energy saving technologies.108
Since Kazakhstan signed the MOU, in compliance with Strategy 2050 and
the Protocol, it has implemented a mandatory emissions trading scheme in 2013
for industrial and power sectors.109 The increased carbon price in the MOU is
intended to promote the development of sustainable energy and decrease reliance

102

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

103

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

The World Fact Book: Kazakhstan, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2015) [hereinafter World
Fact Book] (Kazakhstan was ranked thirty-eighth in the world for refined petroleum products
exports in 2011 with 149,800 bbl/day, and ranked seventeenth for natural gas exports in 2012);
see also Kazakhstan: Making the Most of Its Oil Wealth, International Monetary Fund (Aug. 16,
2011), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/int081611a.htm (“In 2010, the oil
sector accounted for more than [eleven] percent of GDP, and oil exports represented nearly [fiftyseven] percent of total exports of goods and services.”).
104

Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in the Field of Energy between the European
Union and the Republic of Kazakhstan, European Union External Action Service (2006), http://
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/documents/eu_kazakhstan/memorandum_field_energy_
en.pdf [hereinafter MOU] (behind Russia and Norway).
105

106
MOU, supra note 105; see also Nursultan Nazarbayev, The Next Chapter in Kazakhstan-EU
Relations, The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-next-chapterin-kazakhstan-eu-relations-1412703767 (“Cooperation in this field will increase in the future, as
European companies participate in the exploration of the Kashagan oil field, the largest in the
Caspian Sea.”).
107

MOU, supra note 105; see supra notes 68–81 and accompanying text.

108

See MOU, supra note 105.

109

MOU, supra note 105; see also Strategy for Kazakhstan, supra note 85, at 17.
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on carbon.110 The MOU also serves to attract EU companies interested in
becoming involved in the Kazakh energy sector by developing and introducing
alternative energy sources that are ecologically clean.111
According to the MOU “sustainable energy” is “[e]ffectively, the provision of
energy such that it meets the needs of the future without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs . . . . [with] two key components[:]
renewable energy and energy efficiency.”112 Further, renewable energy is defined
as “[t]he use of energy from a source that does not result in the depletion of the
earth’s resources whether this is from a central or local source.”113 Because energy
security is a concern for many nations, the exhaustion of natural resources is an
important topic to discuss.

B. The Exhaustion of Natural Resources
Strategy 2050 references unprecedented population and consumption
growth in conjunction with finite levels of natural resources on a global scale.114
Kazakhstan relies on the notion that other countries will undoubtedly profit
from their reliance on Kazakhstan’s resources because of its current abundance.115
Accordingly, Kazakhstan strives to learn how to properly manage its “natural
wealth,” save export revenues, and transform its “natural resources into sustainable
economic growth that delivers maximum efficiency.”116
Kazakhstan enjoys a windfall of mineral wealth. It possesses ninety-one
chemical elements, including many elements that are extremely rare and command
a high market price.117 Mineral resources are often located close to earth’s surface
which enables cheap extraction of surface mines.118 Since 1991, oil and gas
deposits in Kazakhstan have become major extraction sites and have attracted
foreign investment.119 To illustrate, Kazakhstan holds the richest coal reserves in
110

MOU, supra note 105; see also Strategy for Kazakhstan, supra note 85, at 17.

111

MOU, supra note 105.

Xavier Lemaire, Glossary of Terms in Sustainable Energy Regulation, Renewable Energy &
Energy Efficiency Partnership, Sustainable Energy Regulation Network 10 (2010), http://
www.reeep.org/sites/default/files/Glossary%20of%20Terms%20in%20Sustainable%20
Energy%20Regulation.pdf [hereinafter Glossary of Terms].
112

113

Glossary of Terms, supra note 112, at 8.

114

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

115

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

116

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4 (including major deposits of petroleum, natural gas, coal,
iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold,
and uranium).
117

118

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4.

119

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4.
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the region and is the ninth largest producer and the tenth largest exporter of coal
in the world.120 Thus, the country’s economy is heavily dependent on mineral
production—over seventy-four percent of its industrial production comes from
mining operations.121 Kazakhstan is also a leading supplier of mineral resources
in the world market, and foreign investment has enabled the mining sector to
export large quantities.122 Kazakhstan’s ability to supply natural resources has
prompted the creation of agreements intended to facilitate trade and increase
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
In 2002 Kazakhstan became the first country of the former Soviet Union to
receive an investment-grade credit rating.123 Extractive industries have and continue
to be the engine of Kazakhstan’s growth. However, Kazakhstan is aggressively
pursuing diversification strategies because of Strategy 2050 and climate change
pressures.124 Because Kazakhstan is landlocked and has restricted access to the
high seas it relies on neighbors to export products, especially oil and grain.125
Although Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea ports, pipelines, and rail-lines carrying oil
have been upgraded, civil aviation and roadways still need investment.126
At the end of 2007, global financial markets froze and the loss of capital
inflows to Kazakhstani banks caused a financial crisis.127 The subsequent and
sharp fall of oil and commodity prices in 2008 aggravated the economic situation
further, and Kazakhstan plunged into recession. Like many other countries,
while the global financial crisis took a significant toll on Kazakhstan’s economy,
it has since rebounded.128 Rising commodity prices helped Kazakhstan’s economy
recover, and allowed the Government to realize that an overreliance on oil and
extractive industries is harmful.129 In response, Kazakhstan embarked on an
120

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4.

121

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4.

122

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4.

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4; see Phalguni Soni, Comparing Investment-Grade Loans
and Treasuries: Credit Ratings, Market Realist (Feb. 14, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://marketrealist.
com/2014/02/comparing-investment-grade-loans-treasuries-credit-ratings/ (“Investmentgrade credit rating” is defined as: “Credit ratings are a measure of the creditworthiness of a borrower
. . . . [and are] assigned by credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s. Credit ratings
assigned to debt issues provide information regarding the credit quality of the issuer and the risk of
loan default. The higher the rating, the higher the borrower’s creditworthiness and the lower the risk
of default . . . . A loan, to be considered investment-grade, must be rated BBB- or above. Below the
credit rating of BBB-, debt is considered to have low credit quality and classified as non-investmentgrade, known as ‘high yield’ or ‘junk’ for bonds and ‘leveraged’ for loans.”).
123

124

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4.

125

Kassymova, supra note 8, at 4.

126

The World Fact Book, supra note 104.

127

The World Fact Book, supra note 104.

128

The World Fact Book, supra note 104.

129

The World Fact Book, supra note 104.
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ambitious diversification program aimed at developing targeted sectors including
transportation, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, petrochemicals, and food
processing.130 For example, in 2010 Kazakhstan joined the Belarus-KazakhstanRussia Customs Union in an effort to further “boost foreign investment and
improve trade relationships.”131
Investment potential in the sustainable energy sector of Kazakhstan is limited
due to low energy prices that are driven by readily available low-price fossil fuels,
a lack of guiding legislation, and a lack of reliable regulations.132 Nevertheless,
Kazakhstan has been active in the area of green economic development, organizing
initiatives such as Green Bridge Astana, applying for membership to the
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and developing key elements
of sustainable energy legislation.133 All of these initiatives are in the preliminary
stages and long-term results—either commendable or condemnable—are
unknown at this time.
Kazakhstan is working towards a more diverse economy by adopting new
green policies.134 Strategy 2050’s goal of producing fifty percent of its energy from
renewable resources by 2050 is ambitious when compared to the one percent
change in 2014.135 To attract and explore the best solutions for the renewable
resources sector, Kazakhstan is hosting EXPO 2017.136 In doing so, Kazakhstan
hopes to draw European technology, support, and financial investments to
facilitate its “green goals.”137 Strategy 2050 also seeks to accelerate Kazakhstan’s
130

The World Fact Book, supra note 104; see generally MOU, supra note 105.

131

The World Fact Book, supra note 104; see generally MOU, supra note 105.

132

See Strategy for Kazakhstan, supra note 85, at 16.

Strategy for Kazakhstan, supra note 35, at 16; see Green Bridge Astana, United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.
php?page=view&type=99&nr=55&menu=1449 (last visited Nov. 25, 2015) (“The overarching
goal of the Astana Initiative, adopted in 2010, is the development of regional, interregional
and intersectorial cooperation, and the creation of the environment for introduction of ‘green’
economy principles in Europe and Asia and the Pacific.”); see also International Renewable Energy
Agency (2015), http://www.irena.org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=cat&PriMenuID=13&CatID=30
(IRENA is “an international agency dedicated towards renewable energy.” It works towards the
increasing “demand for further international cooperation on renewable energy policies, financing,
and technologies.”).
133

Strategy 2050, supra note 2 (however, while green policies are mentioned in numerous
places, no concrete policies have been drafted, published, or enacted).
134

135

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.

See EXPO 2017 Future Energ y, A stana , https://expo2017astana.com/en/energy/
klyuchevyie-ponyatiya (last visited Oct. 28, 2015) (“The key concepts of Astana EXPO 2017—
socio-economic and environmental—derive from the contemplation of energy use in a context
linked with sustainable development . . . . Astana EXPO 2017 will help . . . look at energy from a
common, global viewpoint that takes into account the challenges and concerns facing humanity,
safeguarding our health and the environment while boosting economic and social development.”).
136

137

Strategy 2050, supra note 2.
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